N. J. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Company et al : Answer to Petition for Rehearing by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1953
N. J. Meagher v. Uintah Gas Company et al :
Answer to Petition for Rehearing
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Herbert Van Dam; Gilbert C. Wheat; Attorneys for Respondent;
This Reply to Response to Petition for Rehearing is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Reply to Response to Petition for Rehearing, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Company, No. 7723 (Utah Supreme Court, 1953).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1573
J 
Civil No. 7723 
In the Supreme Court 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS. 
1. T'he Court correctly holds that the lands are subject to the 
outstanding lease. 
2. The Court correctly holds that Meagher is the transferee 
of an undivided one-half interest in the rights of the lessee. 
3. 'The Court correctly holds that Meagher's amended reply 
does not plead a new or different cause. 
· · 4. The Court correctly holds that the document of October 21, 
1944, transferred to Meagher the then interest of Stock. 
, 5. The ·Court correctly holds that the document of transfer 
was supported by a consideration. 
6. The ·Court correctly holds that the equitable defenses raised 
by A.pp.ellant Juhan were not sustained. 
7. The rights of Appellant Juhan are adequately defined. 
8. No question raised by Appellant Juhan remains undecided. 
9. ·The decision is correct as a matter of law and is sustained 
by the facts. 
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Civil No. 7723 
In the Supreme Court 
OF THE 
State of Utah 
N.J. MEAGHER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
JoE T. JuHAN, PAUL STocK, RAY PHEBus, 
et al., 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING. 
To the Honorable Chief Justice and Justices of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah: 
Respondent does not presume to suggest that this court 
lacks power to grant rehearing if it so desires. Yet, in 
the orderly administration of justice, the highest courts, 
including this one, recognize that litigation must have an 
end, and therefore have developed self-imposed limita-
tions upon the privilege of rehearing. 
The traditional grounds for rehearing are well estab-
lished. Rehearing is not granted unless a decisive ques-
tion has been overlooked or the court is apprehensive that 
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error has been made with respect to an important prin-
ciple of law. Essentially, the limitation upon rehearing is 
that it will not be employed as a device to give the losing 
party another day in court merely to reargue issues which 
have been clearly raised, thoroughly argued and briefed, 
and definitely decided. 
Notwithstanding that the petition at bar charges this 
court with error as to nearly every point covered by the 
opinion, it does not urge that anything was overlooked or 
was not considered. It could not do so in the face of an 
opinion so throughly considered and so clearly expressed. 
Any suggestion that an important principle of law was 
erroneously decided is subject to two answers: first, no 
error was committed, and, second, no new or important 
principle of law is involved. This case makes no oil law. 
The decision merely determines the legal effect of a docu-
ment which transferred to respondent Meagher the in-
terest in an oil lease formerly owned by appellant Stock. 
True, the opinion necessarily applies the well-established 
principle that interests in oil leases are subject to divi-
sion and co-ownership. But although the petition skirts 
the edges of a challenge to this principle, it carefully 
avoids direct attack. Counsel for petitioners are well 
aware that it is part and parcel of the oil business to 
divide and subdivide the various types of oil titles and 
interests. Thus, lacking any traditional basis for rehear-
ing, the petition seeks to re-argue the entire case. 
Appellants have not seen fit to correlate the specifica .. 
tions of error with their argument. To avoid conf:usion, 
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this reply will be addressed to petitioners' argument sec-
tion by section. 
ARGUMENT. 
I. 
The court's opinion does not hold that its former de-
cision determined the legal effect of the transfer from 
Stock to Meagher. The first opinion noted the existence 
of such a transfer, but clearly declined to decide any 
issue pertinent to its effect. The current opinion holds 
that the Stock-to-Meagher transfer does have the legal 
effect of passing to Meagher the lessee's rights then 
owned by Stock. 
The Stock-to-Meagher document does contain words of 
grant which render it indistinguishable in legal effect 
from a quitclaim deed. This point was thoroughly briefed 
and considered. The final clause contained in the grant-
ing clause of the document, which reads, "insofar as it 
conveys the lands described,'' might be deemed sur-
plusage in view of the fact that the previous words of 
grant are sufficient to transfer Stock's interest. But if 
the reader of the document is in any doubt as to the in-
tention of the transferor, the additional phrase quoted 
above confirms the intention of Stock to pass his interest 
in the leasehold as an interest in the lands described. 
II. 
In this section, petitioners ignore the fact that this case 
is now limited to the determination of the ownership of 
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the le,ssees' interests in a leasehold which has previously 
been held by this court to be valid. All leases contain 
terms which require performance of various acts by the 
lessees. The mere fact that oil leases contain clauses re-
quiring lessees to perform particular acts does not con-
vert them to mere ''performance contracts'' (a phrase pe-
titioners have coined for rehearing purposes only). 
Moreover, Dil leases are particularly subjeet to division 
of int·erests and to ownership in eo-tenancy. It was an 
undivided one-half interest in the rights of the lessee 
which was owned by Stock. So long as he owned that in-
terest, and so long as he wished to retain it, he was sub-
ject to the various obligations of performance contained 
in the lease. He transferred it to Meagher. The remain-
in_g Qne-half interest in the lease was then owned -by 
Phebus, who later transferred it to Juhan. These very 
petitioners, in their unrecorded agreements made between 
themselves years ago, recognized the divisibility of the 
interest owned by Stock from that owned by Phebus. They 
expressly referr.ed to Stock's "half inter-est". In this 
connection, note Exhibits A-48 and A-49. Exhibits A-49 is 
the unrecorded agreem.ent between Juhan and Charles S. 
Hill. It was entered into January 5, 1946. It contains 
the following language: 
''A 121h% inter-est in the said recovery from th~ 
above described acreage belongs to said Stock, based 
on his ·half interest, when and if the title to his in-
terest is sustained by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion, or if his former interest is adjudicated as be-
longing to N. J. Meagher, then, and in such event, 
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5 
the said Stock shall have no interest.'' (emphasis 
ours.) 
The document from 'vhich the above staten1ent is quoted 
is one of several disclosing the Stock-Hill-Juhan arrange-
ments made for the purpose of dividing up the half in-
terest Stock had transferred to l\leagher, if Juhan should 
succeed in wresting it back from Meagher. It was clearly 
understood that Stock would get nothing if Juhan should 
not be successful in the anticipated litigation which is 
this case. 
The foregoing illustrates the readiness with which peti-
tioners themselves treated these leasehold interests as 
divisible. The practice of dealing with oil leases and 
other oil interests as undivided tenancies in common is so 
universal as to require no further elaboration. 
III. 
In this section, we are again confronted with the thrice-
argued question of whether Meagher could properly plead, 
in his amended reply, the interest in the lease which he 
acquired from Stock. When he filed his original com-
plaint, he claimed all legal interests and titles in the land 
by asserting that he was the owner in fee simple. Then 
Stock transferred his interest to Meagher, at which point, 
Meagher, believing the lease to be a nullity, continued to 
assert his claim to ownership of all outstanding inter-
ests. Then Juhan filed his answer, claiming ownership of 
the lease by assignments from Stock as to one-half and 
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from Phebus as to the other half. Then this court held 
the lease to be valid, but it did not pass upon the ques-
tion of who owned what interests therein. Then Meagher, 
having claimed all rights in the land, filed his amended 
reply to conform his claim to the limitations which had 
been imposed by this court in its first decision. Meagher's 
amended reply was in fact nothing more than a clarifica-
tion of the remaining issues. 
Petitioners, in this section, again refer to the lessees' 
rights under the lease as being mere contractual rights 
and argues that such rights cannot be encompassed by a 
pleading which claims all interests in the property. 
Petitioners refer to the lease as a mere ''performance 
contract'', speak of ''contractual rights'' and assiduously 
avoid calling the interest what all know it to be, namely, 
an undivided one-half interest in an oil lease. 
IV. 
This section continues the above argument. It deals 
with the undivided interest in the lease which was owned 
by Stock as something Stock could not transfer. The 
absence of authorities is noteworthy. Of all the various 
types of legal interests evolved by the ingenuity of in-
dustry, respondent submits that none is more generally 
recognized as being transferable and divisible into undi-
vided fractions than oil interests. 
Of course Stock could not assign away rights which 
Phebus owned or rights which Juhan acquired through 
Phebus. From Phebus, Juhan did acquire an undivided 
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7 
one-half interest in this lease. "vVhat are those rights t" 
ask petitioners, but they kno'v full well what these rights 
are, and no clarification of the opinion is required to spell 
them out. They are the rights to explore the lands and to 
produce oil. They are subject to the lessor's rights owned 
by the landowner, and they are also subject to the equal 
co-extensive lessee's rights owned by the co-lessee. They 
can be exercised 'vith or without the co-operation of the 
co-tenant. The legal consequences of such action are well 
established. The mere fact that the lessor and the co-lessee 
are one person-Meagher in this case-makes no differ-
ence, and results in no merger. As lessor, Meagher has 
certain rights and obligations fixed by the lease. As co-
lessee, he shares identical rights and obligations as are 
enjoyed by Juhan and his assigns. No merger of the two 
estates held by Meagher is involved because of the ex-
istence of the rights of Juhan and assigns. These prin-
ciples are elementary and well-known to petitioners. No 
further elaboration of them by this court is called for. 
v. 
This section deals with the subject of consideration, 
a point strenuously urged by appellants throughout the 
case, decided adversely to them each time, and expressly 
laid to rest in the opinion under attack. The petitioners 
ask: "What obligations of performance were passed on 
to Meagher in his role of landlord~'' The answer to this 
question discloses its cunning but disproves its sincerity. 
As landlord, Meagher undertook no obligations when he 
received Stock's undivided half interest in the lease. But, 
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8 
as co-lessee with the Phebus-Juhan group, he obtained the 
same rights and became subject to the same obligations 
that had previously been enjoyed and borne by Stock. 
Moreover, by virtue of the transfer, Stock was no longer 
obligated as lessee. 
In this section which deals with consideration, peti-
tioners conclude by saying: 
"The Modification Agreement, once oil has been 
discovered, carries with it a long-term obligation of 
performance involving the expenditure of many thou-
sands of dollars.'' 
Surely appellees are not urging that Stock is still sub-
ject to those obligations notwithstanding his tranfer to 
Meagher. Confusion is possible at this point, since Stock 
subsequently purchased an interest from Juhan out of the 
Phebus line of title, as to which he, of course, assumes 
lessee obligations. But these obligations have no bearing 
upon his former interest which he transferred to Meagher. 
Irrelevant to the subject of consideration, but in this 
section of the petition, it is argued that, since Meagher, 
as landlord, could gain if the lease were defaulted, he is 
an antagonistic co-tena!lt who can force the other co-
tenants to carry the financial load and risk. But Meagher, 
as co-tenant, is merely the successor of Stock, and cer-
tainly, if Stock had retained his interest and had not seen 
fit to contribute to the cost of exploration, his co-tenants 
could not have forced him to act otherwise. They would 
have been in the same position as any co-lessee whose 
associates will not take an active part in development. In 
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such cases, the aetive co-tenant can proceed alone. If he 
fails to get production, the loss is his. If he succeeds, he 
can charge the inactive co-tenant 'vith the latter's share 
of proper expenses provided he has not been guilty of 
over-reaching the inactive co-tenant In the latter situa-
tion, the law grants full recovery to the inactive co-
tenant, free of the expense offset. But the point here is 
that Juhan and assigns are in no different position after 
Meagher acquired .Stock's rights than they were before. 
There is no principle of law which requires a eo-tenant 
to default his rights because of antagonism toward or by 
his associates. 
VI. 
Here petitioners attack the determination that Stock's 
interest passed to Meagher. They ask: "What was the 
interest, and how did it pass''' The answer to this ques-
tion has been repeatedly argued, briefed, and twice de-
cided. The interest was an undivided one-half interest in 
the rights of the lessee under the leasehold. It passed by 
virtue of a signed document from Stock to Meagher. It 
transferred to Meagher whatever interest Stock had in 
that leasehold. 
Petitioners repeat that the rights of Juhan and as-
signs and their relationship to Meagher are not de-
termined. This point has been answered above. There 
is no .issue before this court under which this court may 
now decide how these parties must conduct themselves in 
the future as co-tenants. It is not the province of the 
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court to anticipate hypothetical controversies. The issue 
here is to determine ownership and title, and that de-
termination has been made. 
Petitioners argue that Juhan and assigns were not 
put on notice that Meagher claimed or could claim an as-
signment of Stock's interest. The quick answer is found 
in Exhibits A-48 and A-49 discussed above. They were 
not only notified of Meagher's claim by his complaint, but 
they actually knew about it and were so apprehensive 
that they carefully and expressly agreed between them-
selves that Stock would get nothing by virtue of his 
former interest unless Juhan, financed by Dougan, could 
succeed in defeating Meagher's claim in this litigation. 
VII. 
Petitioners' concluding section asserts that the issues 
of laches and estoppel against Meagher have not been 
determined. The defenses were pled and twice decided 
adversely to petitioners. Throughout the case, petitioners 
have sought to make it appear that they are persons who, 
without knowledge of outstanding claims, have inno-
cently spent their money to develop the property. This 
presents a strong equitable position, but the facts are 
otherwise. What these petitioners did was to spend their 
money after Meagher had sued. This litigation was com-
menced before petitioners spent a single dollar in oil de-
velopment. When they did make their expenditures, they 
knew that Meagher had an outstanding claim; they knew 
his litigation was still pending; they had discussed it 
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among themselves, and they had even made provision 
for it in their private agreements. One cannot build 
an estoppel by clailning he relied on the hope that his 
adversary "~ouJd overlook his rights. 
The point that possibly innocent purchasers have a po-
sition here is touched upon so ligh~ly that respondent 
cannot tell ""rhether it is actually asserted. Certainly 
throughout this protracted litigation no such position has 
been taken. The petition says that, "As to Juhan, Weber 
and Equity, this court makes no expression of principles 
of right, justice or morality.'' Any suggestion that Juhan, 
at any stage of the proceedings, was an innocent pur-
chaser for value without notice is ridiculous. As to Weber 
and Equity, Juhan's assignees, the record is clear that the 
commencement of this litigation and the lis pe-vndens there-
under (which was filed by petitioner's counsel), preceded 
the acquisition of any interest by these companies. Ex-
hibit A-49 discloses that J. L. Dougan (an officer and di-
rector of Equity and Weber), as of January 5, 1946, had 
agreed to finance this litigation to support whatever title 
Juhan had obtained by assignment from Phebus as to one-
half of the lease and from Stock as to the other half. 
This claimed interest from Stock was obtained by Juhan 
via Chas. S. Hill after Stock had transferred to Meagher 
and all concerned had full knowledge of that transfer and 
full knowledge that this litigation was then pending. For 
any of these parties to seek the role of an innocent dealing 
without notice was too obviously untenable to assert below. 
Certainly it cannot first become an issue upon rehearing. 
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This section suggests that this court's opinion con-
dones reprehensible conduct. Respondent submits that the 
converse is true; the court has merely refused to yield 
to the false equities asserted by petitioners. 
The statement in the petition that petitioners share 
their reward "with a sizeable portion of our citizenry" 
has ·not escaped our notice. The suggestion that this 
court will consider any political factor in reaching its de-
cision is unthinkable. But it does disclose the weakness of 
petitioners' legal position. 
CONCLUSION. 
Respondent respectfully submits th;:tt this litigation has 
been thoroughly presented and considered. One by one 
the arguments presented by petitioners have been met 
and answered. Any suggestion that this court has not 
given the matter thorough and ample consideration is re-
futed by the opinion itself. It is not a basis for rehearing 
that substantial values are involved. Petitioners have had 
their day in court. Respondent submits that this pro-
tracted litigation should be brought to an end and the 
petition denied. 
Dated, April9, 1953. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HERBERT vAN DAM, 
GILBERT c. WHEAT, 
Attorneys for Respondent 
N.J. Meagher. 
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